Chapter 2

Phenomenological Absolutism: Reality as Absolute, Mutually Exclusive Phenomenologies

Opening: Reimagining Reality

What if reality is not a singular universe, a shared world where beings coexist, but a plurality of isolated, mutually exclusive experiential moments, “is-ness” instances or “nows,” each an absolute reality in its own existence? Picture a cosmos not of stars or galaxies, but of countless phenomenal realities—each a self-contained world of experience, unreachable by any other. This is the provocative vision of Phenomenological Absolutism, the core principle of Mutual Exclusivity, a novel ontological framework that challenges everything we assume about existence, experience, and connection. Here, phenomenal reality is not one but many, each a complete truth, defined solely by its own experience, with no coexistence with others, thus no possible bridge between any two instances of reality.

Traditional philosophies—whether monism’s single reality, dualism’s divided cosmos, or solipsism’s egocentric world—assume some form of unity or relation. Phenomenological Absolutism rejects this. It posits that reality is fundamentally phenomenological: the act of experience itself, whether a human’s self-aware consciousness or a cat’s selfless awareness. These realities are not parts of a greater whole; they are ontologically absolute and mutually exclusive, with no shared substrate or universal standard to link them. Like islands in an ocean that does not exist, each phenomenal reality is its own universe, its own truth, and the entirety of existence from its own perspective.

This chapter introduces Phenomenological Absolutism to philosophers new to its radical perspective. We will explore its core claim: that reality manifests as multiple, ontologically absolute phenomenal realities, each defined by its own experience, incomparable and unrelatable. We will outline its key tenets, contrast it with familiar ontologies, and highlight its significance in reshaping metaphysical inquiry. By the end, you will see why the framework of Mutual Exclusivity, with Phenomenological Absolutism at its core, demands we rethink reality not as a shared stage, but as a plurality of absolute experiences, each unassailable in its own terms.

The Core Claim: Reality as Absolute Phenomenology

At the heart of Phenomenological Absolutism, Mutual Exclusivity’s core principle, lies a bold assertion: reality is not a physical universe, a shared world, or a collection of beings—it is phenomenology itself, the act of “reality acknowledging itself” through experience. Each phenomenal reality, whether a human’s self-aware consciousness or a cat’s selfless awareness, is ontologically absolute, the sole ontic truth within its own terms. Unlike traditional ontologies that treat experience as a feature of some broader existence, Mutual Exclusivity declares that phenomenology is reality, the absolute itself, complete and self-contained.

Consider your own experience: the vividness of thought, sensation, or emotion. Now imagine a cat’s awareness—its direct perception of a scent or sound, unburdened by self-reflection. Both are phenomenal realities, each absolute in its exclusive isolation. The human’s experience, colored by a sense of self, and the cat’s, transparent without such coloring, are not parts of a larger whole or dependent on external validation. They are entire realities, defined solely by their own experiential terms. No external observer, no shared cosmos, no universal standard can qualify or relate them—they simply are.

This core claim redefines reality as a plurality of such phenomenal absolutes. Each reality’s phenomenology—its unique mode of experience—is its entire existence, unrelatable to others. There is no overarching framework, no substrate like space or time, to connect them. By centering ontology on phenomenology, Phenomenological Absolutism challenges us to see reality not as a unified stage where experiences play out, but as multiple, isolated, mutually exclusive experiences, each the ultimate truth of its own domain.

Key Tenets of Phenomenological Absolutism

The principle of Phenomenological Absolutism rests on a set of foundational premises that redefine reality as a plurality of absolute, isolated, mutually exclusive realities. These tenets establish the Mutual Exclusivity framework’s radical departure from traditional ontologies.

These tenets frame reality as a paradigm of isolated, mutually exclusive experiences, each unassailable, redefining ontology through the primacy of phenomenology.

Contrasting Traditional Ontologies

Phenomenological Absolutism stands apart from traditional ontologies by rejecting the assumption of a unified or relational reality. To appreciate its novelty, consider how it diverges from familiar philosophical frameworks.

Solipsism posits that only one egocentric reality—my own consciousness—(certainly) exists, reducing all else to my experience. Phenomenological Absolutism counters this by embracing multiple phenomenal realities, each ontologically absolute and equally valid. A human’s self-aware consciousness and a cat’s selfless awareness are both complete realities, none privileged over another. Unlike solipsism’s singular focus, this principle’s pluralism ensures no single phenomenology dominates, avoiding an egocentric trap. Other realities are possible mainly because, firstly, self-identity is a vague, impermanent, and optional phenomenological construct, only acknowledged occasionally, and secondly, a multiplicity of realities or “is-ness” instances can be witnessed within one’s own reality: moments unfold—hearing now, seeing then, thinking next—and states supplant each other without a fixed self—sleeping now, dreaming then, waking up next; q.v. Chapter 15.

Monism and dualism assume a cohesive reality, whether unified (monism’s single substance) or divided (dualism’s mind/matter split). Phenomenological Absolutism rejects such unity, positing instead a plurality of isolated phenomenal realities, each absolute and unconnected. There is no overarching cosmos or shared essence linking a human’s thought to a cat’s perception—each is a distinct, self-contained truth.

Relational ontologies, common in many philosophies, define existence through relations—beings interacting in a shared world, compared via universal standards. Phenomenological Absolutism denies any such relations. Concepts like “otherness” or “existence” are local constructs, meaningful only within a specific phenomenology. For example, my awareness of another being is part of my reality, not a bridge to theirs. Realities are ultimately unrelatable, incomparable, and unqualifiable, with no shared substrate like an ontic space or time.

By contrast, traditional views often assume a common framework where experiential moments (i.e., realities) coexist. Mutual Exclusivity’s Phenomenological Absolutism challenges this, asserting that each phenomenal reality—whether colored by self-awareness or transparent in its selflessness—is an isolated absolute. This radical departure reframes reality not as a shared stage, but as a collection of unassailable, mutually exclusive experiences, each its own ultimate truth.

Epistemological Limits and Gödel’s Insight

According to Mutual Exclusivity’s Phenomenological Absolutism, knowledge is confined to the phenomenology of a single, absolute, momentary reality, revealing profound epistemological limits. Each phenomenal reality—whether a human’s self-aware consciousness or a cat’s selfless awareness—is absolute and unqualifiable—except in its own terms, which would inevitably lead to paradox or infinite regress. This ontological isolation means that no reality can fully characterize itself or others, a constraint illuminated by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, which demonstrate that any system of knowledge cannot fully define its own ultimate nature.

Consider a human pondering their own experience: their phenomenology—thoughts, sensations—forms the entirety of their reality. Yet, they cannot step outside it to grasp its full essence, as Gödel suggests for formal systems: knowledge is inherently incomplete, unable to capture its own foundations. Similarly, questions about other realities, such as “Does a cat’s awareness constitute a separate reality?” are category mistakes. The concept of “otherness” or “separateness” is a local construct, meaningful only within a specific phenomenology, not universally applicable across isolated, mutually exclusive realities.

This confinement underscores the essence of the Phenomenological Absolutism principle: each reality is its own absolute truth, unrelatable and incomparable. Speculating about another’s phenomenology—e.g., the ultimate existence or nonexistence thereof—assumes a shared framework that does not exist. Instead, knowledge within a reality—whether colored by self-reflection or transparent in direct experience—is limited to its own experiential terms. Gödel’s insight explains why we cannot know the nature of knowledge itself: our conceptualization, bound by phenomenology, necessarily renders reality absolute, self-contained, and indefinable beyond its own boundaries. Thus, epistemology in Mutual Exclusivity is radically local, with each reality’s truth complete yet inaccessible to others.

Philosophical Significance

Phenomenological Absolutism, the core principle of the Mutual Exclusivity framework, redefines the landscape of metaphysical inquiry by presenting reality as a plurality of absolute, isolated, mutually exclusive realities, each an unassailable truth. Its significance lies in its radical pluralism, its redefinition of being, and its challenge to traditional metaphysical assumptions, opening new avenues for philosophical exploration.

First, the principle’s radical pluralism asserts that every phenomenology or “is-ness” instance—whether a human’s self-aware consciousness or a cat’s selfless awareness—is an absolute truth, equal in ontological weight. Unlike ontologies that privilege one reality (e.g., solipsism’s ego or monism’s unity), Phenomenological Absolutism grants validity to all phenomenal realities, colored by self-reflection—reflect now, conclude then—or transparent in direct experience—hungry now, chase then. This pluralism dismantles hierarchies, affirming each reality—i.e., each “is-ness” or moment—as complete within its own terms.

Second, it redefines “being” as phenomenological reality, not as entities within a shared world. Beings are not defined by universal categories like “existence” or “self” but by their unique experience. A human’s reflective thought and a cat’s sensory perception are both beings, each absolute, with no external standard to judge them. This shifts metaphysics from relational or categorical definitions to a focus on isolated, experiential truths.

Finally, the principle challenges core metaphysical assumptions. By denying a shared substrate or universal relations, it rejects the notion of a common world where beings interact. Concepts like “self-identity,” “otherness,” or “existence” are local constructs, meaningful only within a phenomenology. This upends traditional questions—such as “What exists beyond my experience?”—revealing them as category mistakes. By rooting reality in phenomenology, Phenomenological Absolutism invites philosophers to explore existence, knowledge, and meaning as confined to absolute, mutually exclusive realities, promising a profound rethinking of how we understand the nature of being and experience.

Shared Reality as a Phenomenological Construct

According to the principle of Phenomenological Absolutism, the notion of a shared reality—a common world where beings coexist, interact, and influence each other—is revealed as a construct within each phenomenal reality, not a universal truth. Each phenomenology, whether a human’s self-aware consciousness or a cat’s selfless awareness, is ontologically absolute and mutually exclusive, incapable of overlapping or connecting with another. Yet, within a single reality, the experience of coherence, such as acknowledging others’ existence, influence, or reaction emerges as a potent feature, particularly in human phenomenology and possibly in nonhuman ones.

Consider a human’s experience: I perceive you, another being, as part of my world—our conversation, your presence, feels like a shared reality. Similarly, a cat may “know” its owner, sensing their familiar scent or voice. In both cases, the acknowledgment of another is real within the phenomenology—it shapes the experience of coherence, a sense that others coexist alongside us. But this is not a bridge between realities. My awareness of you belongs entirely to my phenomenal reality, just as the cat’s recognition of its owner is confined to its reality. These experiences carry no ontological weight; they do not link our mutually exclusive, absolute realities.

This phenomenological inclusion highlights a key aspect of human experience: the perception of a shared world, where interactions seem to weave a common tapestry. Nonhuman realities, like a cat’s, may also exhibit this coherence, albeit transparently, without self-reflection. Yet, according to Phenomenological Absolutism, such coherence is local, not universal. Each reality integrates its own “shared” world within its phenomenology, with no external reality to validate it. Thus, the sense of others—vital to human and perhaps nonhuman experience—is a powerful but localized feature, underscoring Mutual Exclusivity’s essence: reality is absolute, defined solely by its own experience, with no shared stage beyond the phenomenology’s own terms.

Inanimate Entities as Phenomena in Absolute Realities

According to the principle of Phenomenological Absolutism, only phenomenal realities—those deemed with experience or some form of awareness—qualify as beings, each ontologically absolute and mutually exclusive from the others. Inanimate entities, such as rocks or tables, are conventionally regarded as lacking phenomenology—from our human perspective at least—and thus do not constitute beings as such. Their “reality” is supposed to exist solely as phenomena within the phenomenology of another reality, absolute only in that context, with no independent ontological status.

Consider a rock in a human’s experience: its texture, weight, or color is vivid within that person’s self-aware, “colored” phenomenology. Similarly, a cat might perceive a rock as an object to sniff or step over, part of its selfless, “transparent” awareness. In both cases, the rock’s existence would be real but confined to the acknowledging phenomenology—a construct within that absolute reality, not a separate phenomenal reality. However, to speculate whether a rock—even another being, as we argue later—has its own reality (in an ultimate sense) would constitute a category mistake, as the concepts of “otherness” and “separateness” are local, meaningful only within a specific phenomenology. Moreover, that which is absolute—experiential reality—cannot be “had” or lacking—or qualified as existent or nonexistent. In fact, each reality is the sole absolute framework, with no shared or coexisting world to grant or deny the rock, or anything else, independent existence: the principle of Phenomenological Absolutism renders both the admission and denial of other realities inapplicable and meaningless. This is not to say that other realities do not exist or that their existence is unknowable. As stated previously, the existence of different realities is an acknowledgeable fact within one’s own “is-ness,” and self-identity is a phenomenological construct, rendering the question of “to whom a reality belongs” moot and futile. Ultimately, phenomenological acknowledgments cannot constitute claims about the existence or nonexistence of that which is posited as absolute, namely another reality.

This distinction underscores Phenomenological Absolutism’s essence: phenomenology is the only ontic reality. Beings, whether human or nonhuman, are defined by their experience, colored or transparent. Inanimate entities, presumably lacking such experience, are not beings but acknowledgeable phenomena, their reality wholly dependent on another’s acknowledgment. A rock’s “absoluteness” lies in its role within a phenomenology, not as a standalone truth: by rooting existence in experience, Phenomenological Absolutism clarifies that entities deemed inanimate, while seemingly real, are but shadows cast by the absolute light of phenomenal realities, existing only as they are perceived or acknowledged.

Conclusion: A New Ontological Horizon

The principle of Phenomenological Absolutism offers a radical reimagining of reality: not a singular universe or shared world, but a plurality of absolute, mutually exclusive realities, each defined by its own experience. Whether colored by a human’s self-aware consciousness or transparent in a cat’s selfless awareness, each phenomenological moment is ontologically absolute—the sole ontic truth within its own terms, incomparable, unqualifiable, and unrelatable. Concepts like being, self-identity, sameness, or otherness are local constructs, meaningful only within a specific reality, not universal truths. This principle’s core tenets—absolute onticity, mutual exclusivity, and transcendence of relational categories—challenge philosophers to rethink existence as a paradigm of isolated, non-coexisting, experiential absolutes.

By rejecting shared substrates and relational ontologies, Phenomenological Absolutism dismantles assumptions of a common reality, revealing traditional questions about “other” existences as category mistakes. Its pluralism, grounded in the primacy and absoluteness of phenomenology, grants equal validity to all realities, avoiding solipsism’s egocentrism and monism’s unity. The epistemological limits, illuminated by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, underscore why each reality remains indefinable, its knowledge confined to its own phenomenology.

This principle opens a new ontological horizon, inviting philosophers to explore reality not as a unified whole but as multiple, unassailable truths. The chapters ahead will delve further into its implications—ontological, epistemological, ethical, and practical—probing how absolute realities shape knowledge, experience, and meaning. As the core principle of the Mutual Exclusivity framework, Phenomenological Absolutism challenges us to embrace a metaphysics where each phenomenology is its own universe, urging a profound reconsideration of what it means to exist.